Second Distinction

Question One Whether a Nature immediately United Hypostatically to the Word and not Having Joy Involves a Contradiction

1. About the second distinctiona I ask first whether a nature immediately united hypostatically to the Word and not having joy involves a contradiction.

a.a [Interpolation] About this second distinction, where the Master deals with the manner of the assuming of the nature, three questions are asked: first whether the human nature’s being hypostatically united to God and yet its not having joy involves a contradiction; second whether there was there some medium of congruity - and, so as to include each medium, namely intrinsic (as the soul) and extrinsic (as grace), I ask whether the Word assumed the nature primarily and immediately; third whether the incarnation preceded the organization and animation of the body. Argument on the first question:

2. That it does:

Because the nature is either of a nature to have joy or it is not.

3. In the first way it cannot not have joy. Proof:

First because this union is greater than is union through the habit of grace, for according to Augustine On the Trinity 13.19 n.24, “In things begun in time, the supreme grace is that man is joined to God in unity of person;” but it is a contradiction for a nature united through the habit of grace not to have joy; therefore much more so in the case of the former union. There is a confirmation from Augustine ibid. 13.9 n.12, where he argues through the argument a minore [cf. Peter of Spain, Tract. 5n.32]: if the natural Son of God was made son of man [by mercy], then it is more believable too that the natural son of man should be made son of God by grace; if this consequence is good, it holds a minore universally; therefore in the case of Christ, once the antecedent is posited

[sc. human nature united to God through habit of grace and not having joy is a contradiction], the consequent must necessarily be posited [sc. human nature united to God through unity of hypostasis and not having joy is a greater contradiction], and so Christ must necessarily have joy.

4. Second because, if such a nature was not necessarily in a state of joy, it could sin, and so God could be said to sin and as a result to be damned. There is a confirmation of this proof, because, according to Anselm Why God Man? 2.10, if the first man was capable of sin because he was not God, then by this second union, whereby [Christ] was God-man, he was incapable of sin; but he was not incapable of sin unless he was blessed;     therefore etc     .

5. The second member of the disjunction [n.2], namely that a nature that was not of a nature to have joy could be united to God hypostatically, involves a contradiction:

First because a nature incapable of being a person would be a person; for a nature that is united to a person in unity of supposit is a person; a nature ‘not of a nature to have joy’ is incapable of being a person.

6. And second because then there would be a sharing of characteristics, and God might be said to be stone or fire [sc. because stone and fire are things not of a nature to have joy]; indeed, the sharing then would seem more perfect than now, for since any part of a stone is stone, and any part too of God is God, it is not so in the case of man;     therefore etc     .

7. On the contrary:

During the three days of Easter the flesh was united with the Word, and yet it was not in a state of joy; and whatever the Word could preserve that was immediately united to himself, he could immediately assume to himself.

I. To the Question

8. In this question there are two articles: first, whether a nature naturally fit to be in a state of joy would be able not to be in a state of joy; and second, whether a nature not naturally fit to be in a state of joy could be assumed.

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

9. And a negative answer is given [by Henry of Ghent] to both articles.

1. An Assumed Nature Naturally Fit to have Joy cannot not have Joy

a. Exposition of the Opinion

10. The reason posited for the first article is of the following sort: the completion of enjoyment is found in the enjoyable object’s being present to the intellect and moving the intellect to an act of seeing, and in its being thereby present to the will and attracting the will to enjoy necessarily the presence of the end; but the intellect is necessarily moved by this [hypostatic] union; therefore the enjoyment of the will too follows necessarily on the movement of the intellect.

11. Proof of the minor: if the eye could, on the presence of light in itself, see the light existing in itself, then necessarily the light would be present as moving the eye to an act of seeing; but the intellect can see something present in itself; therefore since, by this [hypostatic] union, the uncreated light is present to the intellect, then necessarily it will be present to the intellect as moving it to an act of seeing. There is confirmation from Augustine, On the Trinity 13.9 n.12, where he argues a minore about the double union [n.3].“For if the Son of God by nature has been made son of man, how much more credible it is that the sons of man by nature should become sons of God by grace...; and it is a greater thing to be united to God in person than in grace.” ³⁰

12. Further, powers are founded in the essence of the soul and not conversely;     therefore the order whereby what is in the essence overflows into the powers is more essential than the reverse; but blessedness cannot be in the powers without necessarily overflowing into the essence, so it cannot be in the essence without overflowing into the powers; the essence of the soul, by this special falling into it [sc. of union with the person of the Word], is beatified as much as it can be beatified, because it is made one with God; therefore etc     .

13. There is a confirmation in that blessedness is in the essence primarily before it is in the powers; for blessedness exists in what is supreme in a nature capable of blessedness, and the essence has more the idea of being supreme with respect to the powers than the reverse; but blessedness cannot be posited in the essence unless there is a certain falling of the enjoyable object into the essence; now the falling in that exists in [hypostatic] union is supreme, and by it is nature supremely elevated.

14. A way to make the first argument [n.10] clear is as follows, that sometimes an intellectual habit is necessary for the representation of the object (as in the case of angels), and that sometimes the habit only facilitates the power so that the object may work on it more easily (as in our own case); a habit of glory is not posited in the [hypostatic] union for the first reason, because God is not present to it as enjoyable object by anything that formally informs the nature, but he only represents himself voluntarily as enjoyable object to a power able immediately to enjoy him; therefore if the habit in question is required for the sake of easiness, or for the sake of some elevation of the power so that it can be moved easily by such object, then even without such a habit it can absolutely be moved by the object, because the power of an assumed nature is supremely inclined and elevated and proportioned to the enjoyable object; for because the power of an assumed nature is elevated by the [hypostatic] union to the being of supernatural nature, therefore is the power itself sufficiently elevated so as to be able to enjoy; so this union with the Word supplies, as far as enjoyment is concerned, whatever the habit of glory could do in the other cases.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

15. Against this opinion.

And first I argue against the conclusion in itself as follows:

A prior, by reason of being a prior, can exist in the absence of a posterior without contradiction (and this when there is no necessary connection between them), otherwise the priority of the one to the other would not be preserved (the point is plain from the definition of prior, Metaphysics 5.11.1019a2-4); but a nature capable of being a person can be a person naturally before it acts, and this when it is a person in itself, for operation belongs to a pre-existing supposit and, in the case of an intellectual nature, operation belongs to a person; therefore when it is a person in something else, it is a person in that something else naturally before it acts. - The proof of this last consequence is that in the same instant of nature in which a nature, if left to itself, it would be a person in itself, it would in that same instant of nature be a person in the person assuming it; therefore there is no contradiction in this nature’s being a person in a divine person and yet not having the operation of enjoyment.

16. Further, I make the argument for the position in question [n.10] lead to the opposite side:

First because no nature necessarily enjoys an object unless it is necessarily affected by the object as present; but this [assumed] soul is not necessarily affected by the object, both because it is not so affected by it as to act of understanding, because the object necessarily affects no intellect but the divine intellect (for the object causes nothing outside itself save voluntarily and contingently), and because it is not so affected by it as to act of enjoyment, for the will in its pure natural condition does not necessarily enjoy the end (as was shown in 1 d.1 nn.143-146) - so this soul will not enjoy the end necessarily unless something is superadded to its nature whereby a necessity for enjoying may exist. But nothing superadded is here posited formally in the will by this [hypostatic] union, but all that is posited is a certain dependence on the Word;     therefore etc     .

17. Further, the denial here of the necessity for a habit [n.14] is refuted by the fact that, as was touched on in 1 d.17 nn.121, 129, 133-134, 144, 152-153, 160-164, the most powerful reason for positing [a habit of] created charity is for the act of loving God to be in the power of the will; for no agent has an act in its own power unless the whole of what is necessarily required on its part for such an act is in its power; but a created will does not have in its power, from purely natural resources, the act of meritoriously loving the uncreated good such that this act may be accepted by God; and so there is need for the created will to have the something else that is required for acting so that it can thereby meritoriously love God. Enjoyment exceeds the nature of the human will much more than a meritorious act does, because enjoyment is a supernatural act or form while a meritorious act is not; therefore enjoyment will only be in the power of the human will if the will has some supernatural form which it can use for eliciting this act. But the human will assumed by the Word is a will of a human nature univocally the same as ours; therefore it cannot enjoy without [a habit of] charity.

18. And if it be objected that ‘whatever God can do by an intermediate efficient cause, he can do directly by himself; but this habit, which is posited in respect of enjoyment [n.17], is only an efficient cause, because it is not any other cause (as is plain by running through the causes [Physics 2.3.194b23-5a3, Metaphysics 5.2.1013a24-b16]); therefore God can cause enjoyment in the soul without any intermediate cause whatever’, - I concede the conclusion, as will be stated in 3 d.13 n.91, namely that enjoyment can be caused in the soul immediately by God; but in that case the will does not have the idea of active cause with respect to enjoyment, because it does not have of itself whereby it may act, and so this soul would not be said to enjoy formally, or by an eliciting of enjoyment, the way other souls are said to enjoy - which seems unacceptable.

19. Similarly the conclusion just stated [n.18] would not save the necessity of the enjoyment; for if there were a necessity, then, since the will is only disposed passively with respect to the enjoyment, and this with a potential of contradiction toward it [sc. the will is passive either to enjoying or to not enjoying], and no necessity is taken on the part of what is in a potential of contradiction to something [sc. that which can be or not be is not necessarily one or the other], the necessity of this enjoyment would have to be attributed to God; but God does not necessarily cause this enjoyment, just as he does not necessarily cause anything outside himself;     therefore etc     .

20. And if you say that, on the contrary, when an affect in the intellect is presupposed it necessarily causes enjoyment [in the will] as a concomitant - this was rejected in 1 d.2 n.139, for since intellection (or vision) and enjoyment are two absolutes, there is no contradiction in the prior being caused without the posterior.

21. Further, if it be conceded that the soul of Christ can be thus disposed toward enjoyment without a habit just as can some other soul without a habit, then it would seem altogether superfluous to posit infused virtues in Christ (and yet these virtues are posited by everyone, infra d.13 nn.3, 15-18, 53-54, 87, d.14 nn.30, 108, 110, 126) - which seems unacceptable.

22. Further, from the force of the [hypostatic] union the Word alone is present to the assumed soul, and this as to personal being; therefore if from such presence or union there is the same presence in the idea of the affecting object, the consequence is that from the force of the union the Word alone and not the whole Trinity affects the created intellect - which is false, because the works of the Trinity when operating externally are undivided.

23. And if you say that the idea of seeing three persons is the same as the idea of seeing one person, and that he who sees one necessarily sees them all - it was shown in 1 d.2 nn.31-33, 42-43 that he who enjoys one does not necessarily enjoy them all, and that he who sees one does not necessarily see them all.

2. A Nature not Naturally Fit for Enjoyment cannot be Assumed

a. Exposition of the Opinion

24. As to the second principal article [n.8] a negative answer is given for the following reason, that as God is disposed toward any creature in his general descent into it as regard the being and operation of it, so does he seem to be disposed toward this nature [assumed by the Word] in his special descent into it as to this operation of it and this being of it; but in the first way he cannot descend into anything as to its being unless he also descends into it as to its operation, according to the Philosopher Meteorology 4.12.390a10-13, because each thing is of the sort it is when it can act, and is not of the sort when it cannot act;     therefore God cannot descend in the same way into this nature with a special descent as to its being unless he can also descend into it as to its special operation. Its special operation with respect to a supernatural object is the operation of seeing and enjoying, which in no way belongs to a nature not naturally fit to enjoy (as to an irrational nature); therefore etc     .

b. Rejection of the Opinion

25. Against this opinion:

An intellectual nature is assumable because it does not have in itself a positive entity that is repugnant to this special dependence on the Word, or repugnant to its being communicated to the Word in the way a nature is communicated to a supposit. But whatever is thus communicable is assumable, and what does not have that whereby such communication may be repugnant to it does not have that whereby depending on and being assumed by the Word may be repugnant to it; but a non-intellectual nature does not have a more perfect idea of supposit than an intellectual nature has; therefore neither does a non-intellectual nature have any positive entity whereby a depending with the aforesaid dependence may be repugnant to it; therefore too if on its own part it is assumable, the Word could, it seems, be the term of this dependence of it, because the Word is independent in idea of supposit and so the Word can be the term of the hypostatic dependence of it.

26. It might be said here that if the nature of stone could depend hypostatically, yet it could not depend on a person as on the term, because a person is only the term of the dependence of a nature that can be a person.

27. I first exclude this statement, because created natures are of different ideas, and so their dependences on a foundation, qua dependences, can be distinct and in some way of different ideas, and yet the term is the same and is the object of these dependences according to the same idea on its part. In like manner, if an angelic nature were assumed, it would be of a different idea from human nature, and thus the dependence of the former would be different from the dependence of the latter, and yet both could depend on the same term as on the person of the Word.

28. If it be said that it is because both of these natures are able to be persons that they have something common on which they can depend, and that it is because of this common something that they can be united to a person, but not so a nature unable to be a person - on the contrary: if the Word were an independent hypostasis and not a person, it could be the term of the dependence of another thing; therefore since nothing that per se makes for the idea of being the term of dependence of another thing is taken away from the Word by the fact that the Word is a person, the Word will still be able to be the term.

29. Nor yet does it follow that the assumed nature of a stone would be a person, because ‘to be a person’ states not only ‘to be united’ but ‘to be so united that the mode of the union has a relation to the foundation united’ (whether the manner is intrinsic to the union or is disposed toward it as matter). For a relation could well be posited that would from the foundation, though causally, have some intrinsic mode, because although the superadded mode would not be intrinsic to the relation by the fact of its being ‘capable of being a person’, yet this mode is necessarily connoted by the way union is signified by the term ‘being made a person’; now the mode is this, that the foundation would be of a nature to be a person in itself if it were not assumed by another. Although therefore human nature and the nature of a stone agree in idea of dependence on a hypostasis, yet because they do not agree in idea of the sort of mode of dependence, for this reason they cannot both be a person.

30. Some however say that this is because of a distinction of hypostasis and person in the Word, that something can be united to the Word in idea of hypostasis (as a stone) but not in idea of person.

31. On the contrary: as was said in 1 d.8 nn.107-108, 135, there is in God no order of any realities where one reality might contract another, because then he would not be perfectly simple (and this is the reason that God is not in a genus); therefore there is in him no reality by which he is a determinable hypostasis different from the reality by which he is a person - rather, absolutely no reality is different according to a distinction on the part of the reality by which he might be hypostasis and person. But every real union is to a real term and in the respect in which it is real; there cannot therefore be a real union with the hypostasis and not with the person, since there is no real distinction there. And therefore I do not say that the irrational nature is not a person and our nature is a person because of any distinction of hypostasis and person in the term of the dependence; but I say it because of real distinction in the relations, whether formally through the modes that they have from their foundations or at least concomitantly through their foundations.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

32. To the question, therefore, as to its first article [n.8] I concede that a nature naturally fit to enjoy and being assumed and not enjoying [the Word] does not involve a contradiction, and this even if it be posited that the nature can be assumed without a created habit, as the rejected opinion [n.14] posited. But if it were posited that the nature - so that it might be assumed - must necessarily have in act the habit of glory, then, because of the reason posited against the aforesaid opinion [n.15], I do not see the necessity of it.

33. As to the second article too [n.8] I concede the reason leveled against the opinion [n.25], because a created nature can depend not only with the dependence of caused on cause but with the dependence of what can have a hypostasis on the hypostasis, because a created nature does not have in itself anything whereby such dependence might be repugnant to it; and the Word can terminate this dependence, because, although there not be in it a distinct idea of hypostasis and person, yet it has in itself whatever is required for person and hypostasis in the way person terminates as perfectly as if he were not a person.

II. To the Principal Arguments

34. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.3], when - as to the first member of the division [n.2] - argument is made about the comparison of the two unions, I reply and say that the hypostatic union is greater as to first act, because by this union the being of the person assuming is communicated to the assumed nature; and in fact even now this union includes the other union, which is union with second act and operation; but if the unions were separated, as they could be, that union would be greater which is of the nature to the Word as to term in respect of first act, but not to it in respect of second act and of beatific existence, because blessedness exists in operation more than terms for operation do. Or, to speak more properly, one can say that neither union is greater than the other because they are of different ideas - and since neither includes the other, one of them can exist without the other.

35. To Augustine’s authorities:

As to the first [n.3], I concede that supreme grace exists in this union, because the con-descending of the divine will, which was the principle of the assumption, was supremely gracious; but supreme habitual grace is not in the union by force of the union, although in fact it does now accompany the union. Hence Augustine’s authority can be expounded of the fact - because he is speaking of ‘things begun in time’ - , that the supreme grace of all exists in the union of our nature with the divine Word.

36. Reply can on the same grounds be made to the authority of Augustine On the Trinity 13.9 [n .3] when he gives the argument a minore: it is indeed true that for the Son of God to be really a son of man seems less possible than for a son of man to be able by grace to be a son of God; and therefore if the former is possible by grace, much more is the latter so. But, if a son of God is a son of man, there is no necessity that this same predicate ‘son of man’ should be said determinately of the same subject; indeed, one might perhaps deny the first proposition or combination, namely that a son of man is a son of God by grace; nor, further, is any concession made that Christ is a son of God by adoption; but what follows is that some man or other, or the same man, could be a son of God by grace, because the first combination was made with someone indeterminately [sc. ‘the Son of God is a son of man’], and not to this or that man determinately [sc. ‘the Son of God is this son of man’].

37. As to the argument [n.4] proving that ‘Christ or any assumed nature is incapable of sin, otherwise God could be said to be capable of sin or of being damned or of being a devil etc.’ (which seem horrendous), I reply: just as he who has the light of glory and consummate charity cannot sin, not because these are formally repugnant to sin (as neither is first act repugnant to the opposite of a contingently causable second act), but because God, by his ordained power, cannot not cooperate with the second acts of vision and enjoyment, which acts are repugnant to sin - so God, by his ordained power, cannot not give to a hypostatically united nature supreme charity and, further, supreme enjoyment, which exclude sin; and by this union the assumed nature is incapable of sin, not formally, but virtually by way of disposition, a disposition that, in respect of God as agent, is remote but necessary - as necessary as is it is necessary that someone blessed does not sin.

38. As to the second proof, from Anselm [n.4], I say that the second man [Christ] - because he is God - was, by congruity, filled with supreme grace, whereby he was incapable of sin; and it was not appropriate for the first man [Adam] to be filled with as much grace, because he was not God. So it is not by force of this union that Anselm posits [in Christ] an inability to sin, but only by congruity, because fullness of grace was the accompaniment of the union.

39. When, against the second member [n.2], argument is made about a nonintellectual nature, the response to the first point [n.5], as to how a non-intellectual nature could be said to be united in hypostasis or substance and yet not be a person, is plain because of the difference between the dependence that is called union in hypostasis or in substance and the dependence that is called union in person [n.31].

40. As to the other point [n.6], which is about the sharing of characteristics, some deny the consequence; but since the idea of this sharing is that the supposit receives, in the concrete, the predication of the nature in which it subsists, then even if the supposit were to subsist in the nature of a stone, there seems no reason for stone not to be predicated of it, by saying ‘God is a stone’ just as now one says ‘God is a man’, and both these would be equally true. - But when the further inference is drawn that ‘the sharing then is more perfect, namely because any part of a stone is stone etc.’ [n.6], I say that although a part of a stone receives the predication of stone in general as being a homogeneous or subjective part of the whole, yet it does not receive the predication of that of which it is an integral part, just as no integral whole is predicated of an integral part (as we do not say that a wall is a house); for in this case the Word would not be stone in general but ‘this particular whole stone’; and because no part of the stone would be ‘this stone’, so no part of the stone would be predicated of him.

III. To the Arguments of Henry of Ghent

A. As to the First Article

41. To the arguments for the opinion.

As to the first [n.10], it is plain that it fails in many ways, both because the object does not necessarily move the created intellect, and because - even if it did - the will would not necessarily enjoy, and especially if the will not necessarily have the supernatural habit wherewith to enjoy.

42. To the other argument [n.12], about essence and powers, I say that a creature cannot be beatified in itself, because it is not the infinite good; but it is beatified in the infinite good as in the object that is attained by the operations of its powers, and not in the way that such good is the perfecter of the creature’s essence as to first act; for the following reason, therefore, does the beatitude of the power redound to the essence, that beatitude, when it is in the power, is in the essence as it is of a nature to be in the essence, because the redounding is there mediately and not formally, as if there were there a beatitude different from the one in the powers. Therefore I say that the essence cannot be beatified as it is distinct from the powers, and consequently neither can its beatitude redound to the powers as it is distinct from the powers.

43. And when the reason is confirmed on the ground that beatitude is in the essence first [n.13], the opposite of this was proved in 2 d.26 nn.15-23. - And when you prove that beatitude is something supreme in the soul [n.13], I say that if it is altogether the same as the powers themselves then there is no order of supremacy in the thing; but if beatitude [in the soul] is in some way the foundation of the powers, then although it is supreme by reason of first act, yet it is not of a nature to have a supreme second act, nor consequently of a nature to attain a supreme extrinsic object save by mediation of the power, because the supreme object is only attained by operation of the power. Beatitude then, it is true, is in what is supreme as it is of a nature to be in it; but it is not of a nature to be in the essence save by mediation of the power.

44. And if you argue that beatitude falls into the essence and therefore into the powers, and so it is in the powers by mediation of the essence, I reply and say that this is true as to first act, as to giving being to the powers; for whatever is in the assumed human nature depends in some way on the being of the Word, but there is no need that, in order to give supernatural operation, [beatitude] fall into the power by mediation of the essence.

B. As to the Second Article

45. Hereby is clear the answer to the argument [n.24] adduced for the second article, that just as there is truly a special in-falling as to being, whereby namely the being of the Word is communicated to the created nature, so there is necessarily a special infalling whereby namely the Word could operate as to the operations of that nature (in the way that, as the Word could be said to be fire if he had assumed the nature of fire, so he could be said to heat with the heat of fire); but there is no need that there be an in-falling as to operations repugnant to that nature, as are the beatific operations, such as to understand and to will [sc. the beatific object], in the way that God, by a general infalling, falls into any creature as to the being and operation fitting to that creature but not to any operation not fitting to it or exceeding it.

IV. Conclusion

46. From this question it is apparent that there is no intermediary necessary in the assumption of human nature by the Word; to wit, neither does a soul ‘of a nature to have joy’ intervene between the flesh and the Word (because, from the second article [n.25], a non-intellectual nature could be immediately assumed), nor does grace immediately intervene between the Word and a nature ‘of a nature to have joy’, because a nature could be assumed without its being the case that it would have the habit of grace.

Question Two. Whether the Word assumed the Whole of Human Nature First and Immediately

47. In another way I ask, as to the fact, whether there was any medium of congruity between the Word and the assumed nature - and, in order to include both, namely both an intrinsic medium (as the soul) and an extrinsic one (as grace), I ask whether the Word assumed the whole of human nature first and immediately.

48. That he did not:

Because “he assumed the flesh by means of the soul,” Damascene Orthodox Faith chs. 62, 50, Augustine On the Christian Contest ch.18 n.20, (and the quote is in Lombard’s text, 3.3, 2.2 n.3).

49. Again, the part is prior, by way of generation, to the whole (as the incomplete is to the complete), according to the Commentator on Physics com.28 [“the parts of a thing in accord with its definition precede the thing in being”];     therefore likewise in the case of assumption, because the parts [sc. body and soul] were assumed in the order they were assumable; therefore etc     .

50. Further, “that is ‘prior’ where inference as to subsisting does not convert” [Categories 12.14a26-35]; but this inference holds, ‘he assumed the whole, therefore he assumed the parts’, but the converse does not hold.

51. Again, if he had assumed the whole first, then what he once assumed he would at some point have let go - as in death, because death was corruptive of the whole, for, if there was a true corruption, then the whole that was before did not exist. The consequence is manifest; the consequent seems false and contrary to Damascene ibid. ch.71 [“So although he died as man and his soul was divided from his uncontaminated flesh, yet his inseparable deity remained with both..., and neither was the one hypostasis in this way divided into two hypostases”].

52. Again, about the extrinsic medium, I argue as follows: human nature cannot be united to the Word by beatific union without the habit of grace, and this because both the union itself and the term of the union exceed the ability of created nature; therefore, since the hypostatic union exceeds more, because it is ‘supreme grace’ according to Augustine On the Trinity 13.19 n.24, the consequence is that it could not happen without grace.

53. On the contrary:

If this union were done first part by part, then it is not single.

54. Again, in that case the Word would have been an animal before he was man.

55. Again, as to the second point [sc. an extrinsic medium], the argument is as follows: the general in-falling [sc. creation] is into each nature according to its first existence, not through any intermediate habit in the nature; therefore similarly here, the special in-falling [sc. the assuming of human nature by the Word] will be into this nature first without any intermediate habit.

I. To the Question

56. In this question it is plain there are two questions: one about the intrinsic medium, namely whether any part was intermediate between the Word and the parts, or whether a part (or parts) were intermediate between the Word and the whole, or conversely whether the Word was intermediate between the whole and the parts; the second article is about the extrinsic medium, namely whether grace was the medium between this united nature and the term of the union.

A. About the Intrinsic Medium

1. The Opinion of Others

57. [Exposition of the opinion] - As to the first article, what is said is that the Word assumed the body by the intermediary of the soul [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent].

58. And the point is expounded in the following way [Henry of Ghent], that the soul was first assumed by the Word, and in the second instant the soul was united with the body, and thereby the Word in the second instant unites the body to his person by the intermediary of the soul, which he united to himself first.

59. Likewise, as to the parts compared with the whole, what is said is that, in the order of execution, the parts were assumed first, but in the order of intention the Word first assumed the whole, just as the whole is by intention prior to the parts.

60. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against the first of these points [n.58], namely about the soul in respect of the body, I argue:

That it seems to follow that Christ is not a man first; for [Henry] argues, against the opinion of the Master of the Sentences, that Christ was not a man during the Triduum [the three days in the tomb], because ‘the assumer is not a man save because what is assumed is a man’ - which can, if it be well understood, be expounded as ‘because what is assumed is human nature’; therefore if what is first assumed is not human nature but a part of human nature, the assumer will not be first a man and, as he is disposed to the whole and the parts in the second instant of assumption, so is he disposed now as well [sc. the assumer is not first a man either before he assumes all the parts of human nature or after he has done so, for, by supposition, he is first a part of human nature and only secondly the whole of it]; therefore now too he is not first a man as Socrates is first a man - but this seems unacceptable, since there seems to be no difference in idea on the part of the predicate in the one case [sc. Christ is a man] and in the other [sc. Socrates is a man], although there is a different mode of predicating, as will be touched on below in d.7 nn.16-17. Indeed further, second, it seems to follow that Christ is not a man; the proof is that, if an accident were a composite of essential parts, of a potential a and an actual b, the subject would not be denominated by the accident, because it would be denominated by b alone - for if it were a, it would be a subject in respect of an accident composed of a and b, because a is denominated actually by b; therefore, by similarity, a human nature composed of soul and body is not asserted denominatively of the Word because of the mere union of the soul with the Word, which union is supposed to be the idea of such denomination, for only then [sc. when body is united with soul] could the body be called ‘man’.This argument is stated rather elliptically, but its point seems to be as follows. Suppose that the accident ‘brown’ in ‘brown horse’ were a composite of the subject and the quality, and that the subject were actual and the quality potential with respect to the subject. This supposition is strictly false, for ‘brown’, as an accident said concretely, is actual and actually includes the subject, though obliquely and not directly. However, it creates a parallel with Henry’s supposition about the Word’s assumption of human nature. For, if the accident ‘brown’ is so understood then it is potentially brown before being united to horse and actually brown afterwards (as the body is potentially human before being united to the soul in the Word and actually so afterwards), so that ‘brown’ gets its meaning from ‘brown horse’. ‘Horse’, then, cannot properly be called ‘brown’ for, as subject, it is not the accident but the subject of the accident, and the subject, as such, does not include the accident in its idea. The same problem applies to Henry’s supposition. For since, according to Henry, the Word assumes the soul first and the body through the soul, the Word plus soul is the subject of body. But Henry also says that body in separation from soul (and soul in separation from body) is not human nature, because Christ was not properly a man when his body and soul were separated during the three days in the grave. The assumed body, then, in order to be human body, must include soul in its idea and must mean something like ‘bodied soul’. Thus the assumed body directly includes the subject in its idea, for its subject is the Word plus soul, and, just as the horse cannot properly be the subject of brown and be called brown if ‘brown’ means ‘brown horse’, so the Word plus soul cannot properly be the subject of man and be called man if ‘man’ means ‘bodied soul’. Henry’s supposition, then, must be false and, in order for the Word properly to be called man, the Word must be the subject of ‘bodied soul’ directly and not through the soul, which is to say that the Word must assume soul and body immediately and not the second through the first. ³¹

61. Again, incommunicability belongs to the idea of person, and this by reason of the ‘by what’ as has frequently been expounded [3 d.1 n.50, 1 d.2 nn.379-380, d.23 nn.15-16]; this [incommunicability] belongs more to matter than to form, because form is communicated to matter in the whole as giving being to matter; therefore, just as this incommunicability in a nature that is a person in itself is appropriated more to the body than to the soul, so, when a nature is a person in another, then it seems (if there is any order in this case) that the dependence of the body - in order for it to be thus subsistent in itself - is terminated before the dependence of the soul is.

62. Further third: a body is of a nature to subsist in itself; therefore this ‘subsisting in itself’ is not supplied in a body unless the body is assumed directly; for the body is capable of such assumption just as it is capable too of subsistence in itself; when therefore the union of the soul with the Word exists, then, since the body is not immediately assumed through that union, the potency in the body to be assumed by the Father still exists, and thus the same man may be assumed by two persons - which seems unacceptable because in this way no person will be the man. And yet from these parts, when united, the man exists; therefore he is a man and not a person unless he is a person in himself - which is unacceptable because then the parts will be hypostasized twice, namely intrinsically and extrinsically.

63. Further, there would have then been a new assumption in death, because then the body was united with the Word immediately and not united through the soul, because its order to the soul was in potency only.

64. Further, he was not a man because of these two unions, as was shown in the second reason [n.61], so a third union is required, which would first be the union of the whole, and because of this third union the Word would be a man; but this third union is sufficient by itself without the other two; therefore the other two are superfluous.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

65. As concerns this article [n.56], therefore, a distinction can be drawn about the medium; for just as - between an agent and its action or effect - something can be posited to be medium either as the ‘what’ (as the proximate agent between the remote agent and the effect) or as the ‘by what’ (as the form of the agent), so between the recipient and the received a double medium can be posited, a ‘what’ and a ‘by what’. For just as something can be the reason of acting for something, so can something be the reason of receiving for something; and the medium with respect to the reception of an accident can sometimes be the proper form of the receiver, just as a subject first receives its proper accident through its proper form (as through its proper reason of receiving).

66. As to the issue at hand it can be said that, in the passive assumption of human nature into the Word, there was no medium as ‘what’ between the Word and the whole human nature, but the whole human nature was assumed immediately.

67. The proof is as follows, that what, if left to itself, has first the capacity to be a person in itself, is first a person in another when it is assumed, because the divine personhood supplies the place of the thing’s own personhood; the whole human nature, if left to itself, and not a part or parts of it, is in this way first and immediately able to be a person;     therefore etc     .

68. The proof of the major is that the whole human nature is a person in another or by another in the same instant of nature in which, if left to itself, it would be a person in itself; for it is not of a nature to be assumed before that instant (because it was not a singular nature before that instant), and it is not assumed after that instant (because after that instant it would be person by itself).

69. The proof of the minor is that in the same instant of nature in which the matter or the form precedes the whole, neither the matter nor the form is of a nature to be a person; but when the whole nature exists from these united parts, then first is the thus united whole a person, if it is not impeded by the assumer.

70. Speaking of medium in the second way [n.65], namely as ‘by what’, one can concede that the soul is the medium in the assumption by the Word - and this with respect to the whole nature, because the soul is the formal idea of this nature, whereby the nature is capable of being united (just as the soul is the formal idea whereby a man, not only as efficient principle but also as proximate subject, is formally capable of laughter); and just as the soul is the form of the subject, so it can be the form that constitutes the nature, and yet it is the proper reason for the whole nature of receiving this union, because it is the proper reason constituting the whole that is receptive of the union. Nor on this account need the soul be first assumed as the ‘what’, just as neither is the soul capable of laughter as the ‘what’, although it is the ‘by what’ a man is capable of laughter.

71. And by reason of this idea of being medium can the whole nature truly be said to be assumed through the soul, such that the ‘through’ states with respect to the predicate the circumstance of quasi material cause, although, with respect to what is determined through the soul, it states the formal cause -just as also in the statement, ‘man is capable of laughter through the rational soul’, the form of the soul is indicated to be quasi material with respect to the predicate. In this way too the soul can be conceded to be the medium between the flesh and the Word, because the soul is the total form of the nature assumed first and is, for this reason, the medium ‘by which’ the whole nature is what it is and is assumable and is assumed; and the soul is hereby itself assumed, because it is part of the nature assumed first. Thus too is the flesh in its own way assumable and assumed.

3. Three Doubts against Scotus’ Opinion

a. Statement of the Doubts

72. But there is, as to the first member of the distinction [n.65], a doubt here what the nature is that is said to be assumed first [nn.66-67], namely whether it is some being other than the parts. The Commentator, Physics 1 com.17, seems to say that, although a whole is other than the parts or other than each part separately, yet it is not other than all the parts together; and if this were so, since there is no real assumption save of a real thing, then the assuming of the whole would be nothing other than the assuming of all the parts. Also, if the whole is a being other than the parts, there is a doubt whether it is other by some absolute entity or by some relative one. And, third, there is a doubt whether there is any form of the whole other than the form that is a part.

b. Solution of the Doubts

73. [As to the first doubt] - As to the first doubt, I show that a whole is a being different from all of the parts jointly and separately.

First, because otherwise the difference between ‘whole’ and ‘one’ in Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-33 would not be true, for it is said there that a single whole that is per se one is other than a single whole that is one by aggregation (as a pile or a heap), and this latter whole is merely its parts. The inferred consequent seems unacceptable, first from Metaphysics ibid. [where it is said that a heap has no cause of its being one but a whole does], and second because also a whole that is per accidens one is more one than a whole by aggregation and less one than a whole that is per se one - and yet a whole that is per accidens one is not merely its parts, for, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.12.1037b14-18 ‘On the Unity of Definition’, a white man is a ‘one something’ by the fact that whiteness is in the man; he would not therefore be such a single whole if whiteness did not inform him.

74. Further, the per se ‘term to which’ of generation is something that has its proper entity, because generation proceeds to the being of its proper term; but the whole, not one or other part of it, is the ‘term to which’ of generation; indeed, if each part were to pre-exist and then first be united, the generation or production would no less be of the very composite - just as, in the case of resurrection, given that both the soul and the body as to their entity pre-existed, resuscitation would still be of the whole composite; but resuscitation would not be to the being of the body or of the soul, nor to both beings; therefore to some third thing different from them.

75. Third, one can argue similarly about corruption, following the argument of the Philosopher at the end of Metaphysics 7 (17.1041b11-17), because a and b remain and not ab, and the same thing cannot really remain and not really remain, so ab is something other really than a and b; therefore, since so it is in the case of all per se composites, namely that it is not repugnant to the idea of parts that they should remain and the whole not, therefore there will be some entity proper to the whole itself that is different from the entity of the parts.

76. Again fourth, because otherwise [sc. if what is asserted in the first paragraph of n.73 is not true] nothing would be per se caused by the intrinsic causes, namely by matter and form; for because these causes cause this composite, it is plain that these causes are parts of the thing caused; but these causes are not parts of the other part nor of both parts, because neither one nor both of them are caused, for they are themselves the first causes and the first principles of the thing;     therefore etc     .

77. Again, it would follow, fifth, that there was no being where the proper feature and operation or any proper accident would per se exist, because these exist in the species and not in the matter or form of the species, nor in both matter and form together save as matter and form are a unity in some per se whole.

78. [To the second doubt] - About the second doubt [n.72], I say that a whole is also a different being and with a different absolute entity, because a mere respect would not suffice for calling some whole being a per se one, for in the case of a single whole that is per accidens one there is a per se respect - and an essential respect - between part and part, as is plain of the dependence of an accident on a subject; likewise, the quiddities of all absolutes, as including matter and form and as being definable (for they are definable species as such) are not just relative entities formally, which, however, they would have to be if the proper entity of a whole were a respect.

79. This conclusion also follows from the reasons given for the first doubt [nn.73-77], for no generation is per se toward a respect as to the term to which [n.74]; nor either is corruption from a mere respect as from the term from which [n.75]; nor are absolute causes causes of something merely relational [n.76]; nor does a proper feature follow a whole precisely insofar as the whole is relational, nor either does a proper operation so follow nor any absolute accident [n.77]; nor finally does being able to assign a specific difference for all quiddities seem possible, because positing a difference merely of respects between united parts does not seem possible [n.73]. Also, as to the issue at hand, it does not seem possible for a respect to be the proper idea of founding a relation of union with the Word - which, however, should be possible when positing that the whole is assumed in the way before stated [nn.65-71], if the entity of the whole, as distinct from the parts, not be posited as being absolute.

80. [To the third doubt] - As to the third doubt I say that if in a whole there is understood to be, aside from the form of the part (of which sort in man is the intellective soul), another form supervening on it as it were that is also something of the whole itself and yet is called the form of the whole by distinguishing this form from the form of the part (because it more completely constitutes the whole than the other form does), then this understanding is false; for in that case there would be in man some form constituting man that is more perfect than the intellective soul, which is unacceptable. Likewise, if this third doubt rests on a reason taken from the perfection of the whole, namely that a one would not be made from the matter and form (each of which is a part) save through some form uniting these parts, which form would be the form of the whole, then this reason would entail a process to infinity; for I ask, as to this form, how it makes a one along with the matter and form of a part. If it does so of itself, then the same could be granted about the form of a part, that it is of itself of a nature to make a one along with the matter; if it does so through something else, there will be a process to infinity.

81. I say then that over and above the form that perfects the matter and is thereby said to be a form of a part (and understanding this to be the ultimate form, when positing several forms in the same thing), there is no need to posit some form perfecting as it were both the matter and form, because matter and form are in the whole not parts of the same idea or elements that are perfectible by some third act, but one [sc. matter] is the perfectible proper and the other [sc. form] is act; and this reason is why they make a per se one, from Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-8, 23-25.Aristotle: “As to the doubt what the cause is of being a one..., if this is matter but that form, and this indeed is in potency but that in act, the question asked will seem no longer in doubt.” Scotus’ commentary ad loc., sect.1 ch.6 n.37: “One must note that the strength of this solution stands in this fact.that man.is per se one insofar as he is composed of matter and form as of potency and act; nor is any cause to be sought why these make a one other than that the former is as potency while the latter is as act.” ³²

82. If however the form of the whole is understood not to be something constituting the whole but to be the whole nature, as the quiddity, then in this way it can well be conceded that the form of the whole is other than the form of a part and that the nature of quiddity can be called form (the point is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.2.1013a26-27, ‘On Cause’Aristotle, “But in another way cause is said to be the species [form] and exemplar; this then is the idea of the ‘what it was to be’ [the quiddity].” Scotus’ commentary ad loc., sect.1 ch.2 n.17, “For form belongs most of all to the quiddity of a thing. One must note that the form of a thing is called the species, insofar as it is the principle of being and of specification.” ³³); but that there is some form other than the form of a part is plain from the first article here touched on [nn.73-75].

83. But in respect of what is it the form?

I reply by saying that it is the form in respect of the whole composite, not indeed the informing form but the form whereby the composite is a quidditative being; and in this way the whole being formally is the form of the whole (the way a white thing is said to be white by whiteness); not indeed that the form of the whole is as it were the cause of it, causing the whole as it were along with the matter and the partial form, but it is the whole itself precisely considered, in the way that Avicenna speaks of it in his Metaphysics 5 ch.1, “horseness is only horseness.”Avicenna, “Although the universal itself would be man or horse, the intention in this case is different, additional to the intentionality that is humanity or horseness; for the definition of horseness is other than the definition of universality, and universality is not included in the definition of horseness... Horseness, therefore, from the fact that many things come together in its definition, is common but, from the fact it is taken along with indicated properties and accidents, it is singular. Horseness then in itself is just horseness. For humanity itself, from the fact it is humanity, is something additional to any of the things mentioned [sc. the accidents and properties of this man], and in its definition nothing is taken but humanity alone.” ³⁴

84. And if you ask for the causes of this entity, I say that it is a third from its causes and comes from them causally and not from other causes; and as to why such and such causes cause and constitute a third entity, different from themselves, which is a per se one [sc. in the case of substance], and as to why other causes cause a third entity, different from themselves, which is not a per se one [sc. in the case of substance and accident], there is no reason other than that the former entities of causes are such as they are and that the latter are of a different idea. The Philosopher insinuates this in Metaphysics 8 [n.81] where, responding to a question about the unity of the composite, how from matter and form it becomes a per se one, he assigns as cause that ‘this is per se act, that is per se potency’; and just as this is act per se and that potency per se, so this whole is one per se; and just as this is act per accidens and that potency per accidens, so this constituted whole is one per accidens. But as to why this entity is act per se with respect to this thing and another entity is only per accidens with respect to something else has no reason other than that an entity of this sort is ‘this entity’; for, just as between the hot and heating there is no middle in genus of efficient cause, so neither between this form and thus informing [sc. informing a substance as opposed to a substance and accident] is there any middle in genus of formal cause; but just as the hot heats insofar as it is hot and not because of anything else, so the soul thus perfects and thus constitutes insofar as it is soul.

85. It is thus plain, therefore, with respect to this doubt [sc. the third, nn.72, 80], that there is a medium of congruity [nn. 46-47] of the union of human nature with the Word, namely that the medium is the whole nature constituted from the parts, which is a certain absolute third thing, different from each and both of the parts jointly and separately.

c. To the Authority of the Commentator Adduced in the First Doubt

86. And therefore the remark that was adduced from the Commentator on the Physics [n.72], namely that ‘the matter and form together’ are the same as ‘the whole’ and conversely, has no weight. For it fails in this case as in others by reason of the fact that no distinction is drawn between what is per se and what concurs as a necessary requisite; the ‘to be’ indeed of the whole is necessarily accompanied by the union of the parts and conversely, and yet the union is not the ‘to be’, because union is a respect and ‘to be’ is an absolute - just as the order of efficient causes, when there are many efficient causes that are ordered and in proximity to each other, is a necessary prerequisite for the causing of an effect, and yet the order or the proximity are not the ‘to be’ of the effect but the absolute ‘to be’ alone is. Nor is it unacceptable that some absolute depend on and prerequire - or at any rate in some way co-require - some respect; for universally any absolute that is caused by several causes necessarily pre-requires the union and proximity of those causes in their causing. And thus here, in the case of the hypostatic union, it can be the case that the whole entity of the whole is absolute even though it necessarily prerequire or co-require the union of the absolute parts.

B. About the Extrinsic Medium

87. [The opinion of others] - As to the second principal article [n.56], about the extrinsic medium, the position is taken [Aquinas, Bonaventure] that grace was the medium of congruity in this [hypostatic] union.

88. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this position I argue first that in the instant of nature in which the nature would be a person in itself if it were not assumed, it would, in the same instant, be a person in another when it is assumed (this was made clear in the first article [n.56]); but it would naturally first be a person in itself before it had the habit of grace, because the habit is the principle of operating and consequently is the perfection of that to which operating belongs; but to operate belongs to a supposit; therefore the nature would first naturally have the idea of supposit in itself before it had any grace or habit, which alone is the principle of operating. Therefore when it is assumed too it is naturally united first before grace is given to it; therefore grace is not the medium.

89. There is also a confirmation, because what belongs in itself to another belongs to it before something else does if that something else belongs to it per accidens; nature, if left to itself, would be a person in itself and of itself; therefore that would belong to nature first before the accidental habit did.

90. Again, John 1.14, “We saw his glory as of the only begotten from the Father” - where John seems to say that ‘to be only begotten’ is the proximate reason for the congruence whereby he [the Lord] has the fullness of grace; therefore the nature was subsistent in the Word before so great a grace was conferred on it, because it would seem improper for so great a fullness of grace to be conferred on the nature in an instant in which the nature is understood not to be united with the Word.

91. Further, the grace would not formally unite [nature with the Word] (as is plain), so grace would be disposed in idea of a disposition in the other extreme; but this is false,a because the nature itself, where grace is, is a person, and for that reason all its accidents are united to the person accidentally and mediately; therefore in the case of this union no accident could have been the medium (just as neither is whiteness the medium in the union of surface with body).

a.a [Interpolation] because the real and actual existence of an accident presupposes, in the order of nature, the real existence of the subject; but grace is in the soul of Christ as an accident in a subject; therefore its real and actual existence presupposes the real existence of the soul. But the soul of Christ only had real existence in the Word; therefore the soul was assumed by the Word first in the order of nature before it was the subject of grace.

II. To the Principal Arguments

92. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.48] the answer is plain, because the authorities are to be understood as speaking about the medium ‘by which’ and not the medium ‘which’.

93. To the second [n.49] I say that something can be prior in itself to another when not comparing them to a third thing, as the parts of my nature are prior to my whole nature in the order of generation or execution, but not when comparing them to being a person, because my parts are not a person before my whole nature is. So too is it in the case of being a person in an extraneous person; and the reason is that, in the instant of nature in which the whole is whole, it is able to be a person in itself or in another - and therefore, whatever precedes it does not precede in ability to be a person, because it is not, as prior, able to be a person.

94. To the next [n.50] I say that not everything that is prior in consequence is naturally prior, that is, causally prior (or prior as something is said to be prior in execution by priority of material cause, or said to be prior in intention by priority of formal cause). Likewise, according to the Philosopher in the Categories 12.14b11-22,Aristotle, “...there is another way of being prior; for, in the case of things that convert according to consequence of essence, that which is in some way cause of the other is rightly said to be prior in nature., for being a man converts in consequence of substance with true speech about it.; but the thing seems to be in some way the cause that the speech is true, for speech is said to be true or false because the thing is or is not.” ³⁵ what is prior in causality can be simultaneous in consequence, “for being a man converts in consequence with true speech about man,” and yet the being of the thing is prior in causality, “for speech is true or false by the fact that the thing is or is not.” So here, priority in consequence can stand along with non-priority in causing, as is universally the case with an accident that is necessarily consequent to a number of things, as hot is to fire and air; that is why fire and air are consequent according to consequence and yet in causality the hot is posterior to both of them; so it is in the issue at hand, that although the being-assumed of the parts follows the being-assumed of the whole and not conversely, yet the second is not prior in causality. However, it could be said that, in the way in which the parts are assumed, the being-assumed of the parts and the being-assumed of the whole are convertible.

95. To the next [n.51] I say that if Christ truly died then, since the corruption of the body is not nothing, one can truly say that he had some entity in death that he did not have alive; but he did not, as far as concerns the essential parts of the nature, put aside the nature he assumed. And such is the understanding of Damascene (as is plain there in ch.71), and not something different; he means in ch.73Damascene, “In death.neither soul nor body had their own hypostasis besides that of the Word, but there was always the one hypostasis of the Word and not two.” ³⁶ that the soul and body in death were never in their own hypostasis but in that of the Word.

96. But a doubt remains, because it seems that in death there was a new assumption of a part in itself that was not united before.

97. On this point see the solution in d.16 n.39 infra.

98. To the last argument [n.52] I say that, if ‘grace’ is taken for the gratuitous will of God, then God is said to do this from grace because he is said to do everything gratuitously that is included the less in a thing and exceeds the faculty of it the more; and, in this way, because ‘subsisting in the word’ exceeds the faculty of created nature, so God does this gratuitously and with supreme grace, that is, with his supreme condescending gratuitous will, because conferring on nature what nature can least attain of itself and what most exceeds it. But if ‘grace’ is understood as an informing created habit, then, although this is concomitant to the united nature, it is yet not necessary for the union. And so, when it is then argued [n.52], as by an argument a minore, that grace is necessary for the beatific union, I say that, as to the hypostatic union, the conclusion does not follow, because beatific union is through operation and second act, and for this union the soul has no power unless it have the form [sc. grace] - but this [hypostatic] union is to first existence, and for this no accident in the united nature is presupposed, just as also for first supernatural existence, which is had through the habit of grace, nothing further raising up the nature is required; for thus there would be a process to infinity, as always one natural thing would be disposing it for another. And just as what gives first act in this case could perfect nature immediately, so can the existence communicated by the Word be the immediate principle of the [hypostatic] union.

Question Three. Whether the Organization and Animation of the Body Preceded the Incarnation

99. Whether the organization and animation of the body preceded the incarnation. 100. That they did:

Because [William of Ware] the body of Christ was generated “from the most pure blood” of the blessed Virgin, according to Damascene [Orthodox Faith ch.46]; but the generated body is more dense than the blood from which it is generated, according to Damascene [ibid., ch.50]; therefore the blood occupies less space and consequently the formation or conception or generation was necessarily accompanied by local motion; and that not in an instant, so not along with the incarnation either (which happened in an instant), nor after it; therefore before it.

101. Further, the organized body had a different figure from the blood it was generated from, and the body was differently formed, because the blood was uniform in its parts but not so the organized body; therefore it occupied a different place; therefore the formation required local motion; therefore it happened in time and beforehand.

102. Further, every generable and corruptible substance that is not created but produced is produced through alteration; all the matter assumed by the Word is generable and corruptible - and it was not immediately created because it came from blood; therefore it was produced through alteration and consequently a potential part of the whole was altered into the form of the same whole; therefore this potential part was first under the privation opposed to that form, and this prior in time because privative opposites cannot be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore the body was nonanimated prior in time to being animated.

103. On the contrary:

There is the Master in the text [3 d.2 ch.3] and Damascene; and again, Damascene [ibid., ch.46] says, “at the same time flesh, at the same time flesh of the Word of God, at the same time animated flesh.”

104. I say that the question can be understood of priority in time or of priority in nature.

I. To the Question

A. Of Priority in Time

105. The first way has two articles: namely about the order of animation in relation to incarnation, and second of the order of organization in relation to animation.

1. Of the Order of Animation in Relation to Incarnation

106. As to the first article I say that animation did not precede incarnation in time, because then the nature would at some point have been a person in itself (and not in the Word), namely as soon as there was animated flesh.

107. Proof of the consequence:

For the animated body, if it is at any time subsistent in itself, is a person. The consequent is false, because then the blessed Virgin would not have been the true Mother of God; for she would not have borne God but that pure man whose nature would afterwards have been united to God. This consequent is against Damascene [ibid., ch.56], who determines, against Nestorius, that the blessed Virgin was true Mother of God and not of some pure man only. The consequence is plain, because the whole idea of the maternity of Mary was complete in the production of that nature.

2. Of the Order of Organization in Relation to Animation

108. As to the other point, about complete organization [n.105], I say that organization can be understood:

On the one hand either as the final induction of the form immediately disposing it [the body] to the soul - according to one opinion [Avicebron, William of Auvergne, et al.] - or as the induction of the intellective soul - according to another opinion that posits the organic body to exist formally by the soul [Aquinas et al.].This question about the unity or plurality of substantial forms is discussed extensively by Scotus in Ordinatio 4 d.11 q.3. ³⁷

109. Or, on the other hand, organization can be understood as the change preceding the ultimate induction of the organic form, disposing it to intellective form; but two changes precede, namely the local motion whereby the matter is taken to the place proper for generation, and the alteration by which the matter in the due place is altered and disposed for the inducing of the form of the organic body.

110. And in this second way [n.109] - according to an opinion that posits the heterogeneous parts of the organic body to differ in species [infra d.4 n.38] - many generations and many changes can be posited; for just as the parts have different quidditative substantial forms, so there is a different generation for each of them and there is a proper alteration for each generation; and also, further, one can posit that not all these generations are simultaneous but that one precedes another in time, and thus one alteration disposing to one generation is naturally prior to another.

111. But however it may be with these matters, one can say that organization taken in the first way [n.108], namely the organization whereby the body is said to be organized, does not precede animation in time, even in our own case, because then a father would in no way generate a man (as is plain from Augustine [rather, Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter n.60, before the end, “Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that God the Word made flesh has one person of his divinity and his flesh, for God the Word deigned to unite full human nature truly to himself,” and Damascene ch.46 [n.103]); for the whole of a father’s action would be complete in duration first before the soul was complete; but he does not generate a man whose whole action is complete in time prior to and before a man is complete.

112. But if the discussion be about organization in the second way [n.109], one must hold that all inductions of partial substantial forms, even if there be many of them, yet take place in the same instant, and no part is prior in time to another, because no part assumed by the Word ever pre-existed in its own supposit - and this is what would have happened if any part had existed prior in time.

113. But as to the transference of matter to the place proper for generation, and as to the alteration preceding the generation of the whole or the generation of the parts [n.109], there is doubt whether these preceded the incarnation in time or existed in the same instant as it; for if they are posited as having existed together in time, then it seems more possible to save the fact that Mary cooperated in these motions (on this question see infra d.4 n.41) - and if the whole is posited as having happened in an instant, so that there was no local motion there nor any successive change, then the fact is more saved that in the ultimate instant of the Virgin’s express consent the Word-man existed in the Virgin’s womb, because before that instant there does not seem to have been any operation specific to the incarnation, and in that instant the whole incarnation seems to have been complete.

B. Of Priority in Nature

114. About priority in nature, it seems one should say that the foundation of the relation naturally precedes the relation, because - according to the Philosopher Categories 7.6a36-37 and to Augustine On the Trinity 7.1 n.2 - what is nothing in itself is nothing in relation to another [cf. 1 d.3 n.31], and the whole nature is the foundation of this relation (from the previous question, n.86); therefore the entity of the whole nature naturally precedes the incarnation and so animation naturally precedes it as well; but animation is naturally preceded by the organization of the whole, according to one opinion, or at least is simultaneous with it, according to the other opinion about forms [n.108].

II. To the Principal Arguments

115. To the first argument [n.100] I say that if it were conceded that the alteration precedes the incarnation in time, it could be said that, along with the alteration, there was occupation of a lesser place (as is universally the case with any condensing), and so there would be posited one per se local motion there, by which the matter was removed to a place appropriate for generation, and another per accidens local motion concomitant to the generation of the denser body, by which a lesser place would be occupied; and, in the ultimate instant of condensing, all the partial forms and the whole form of the organic body would be induced and, in that instant, the whole would be assumed, though in a certain order of nature. - But if it be posited that the alteration did not precede, then it can be posited that the occupation of a lesser place was sudden, and this by divine power, provided however that created virtue could not cooperate with it (discussion of which is contained in d.4 n.46 infra).

116. The same point must be made in answer to the second argument, about figuration [n.101].

117. To the third [n.102] I say that alteration properly speaking is between privation and form, as is plain in Physics 5.1.225a7-18, and not between negation and form [cf. 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 n.19]; but privation is a negation in something naturally fit [sc. for the relevant form, Categories 10.12a29-31]; and therefore, when the form is produced simultaneously with what receives it, there is properly no alteration to that form,a but only alteration to what is receptive of it. But since here [sc. the hypostatic union] the intellective soul is induced (even in our own case) simultaneously with the being of the organic body, there is properly no alteration to the soul but only to the being of the organic body; and the subject of this alteration is the matter that existed before under the form of blood. - And when in the major is taken [n.102] that ‘every generable and corruptible form, if it is not immediately created, receives being through alteration of the subject’, this proposition must be denied if it is understood to mean that being is received through an alteration of which the form is first the term, and if it is understood to be about alteration properly speaking; however the proposition can be conceded if, namely, it is about an alteration of a thing some part of which is the term, and it is about alteration commonly speaking. So here [sc. the hypostatic union] the term of the alteration properly speaking is the organic body, which is some part of the animated body.

a.a [Interpolation] because what is receptive was not under privation before it was under form, nor was it naturally fit to have form before it had it.